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ABSTRACT 
This master’s thesis paper examines the relationship between CEO compensation and 
firm performance in the United States stock market S&P 500. Corporate governance has 
been an essential topic in an accounting and finance domain related to business studies 
and academic publications during the past decades. Executive, especially the CEO, 
compensation has growth rapidly these days, which has caused criticalness of the 
justification among shareholders and stakeholders.  In particular, the compensation of the 
CEO has been heated discussion among academic and business world. The importance 
of corporate governance is growing more extensive, and the relationship between 
principles and agents in business is tightly bounded. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the effect of the CEO’s compensation on firm 
stock performance in S&P 500 firms from 1993 to 2016. The thesis uses executive 
compensation data of the Compustat Execucomp database and S&P 500 firms’ financial 
data from the same database. The paper aims to to find how CEO compensation products, 
salary, bonus, and other compensation, are associated with firm performance. 
Additionally, the paper strives to find how CEO compensation was associated in 1993–
2003 and 2004–2016 periods and compares those two characters results. Moreover, the 
thesis examines the pre-crisis period 2004–2006 and the crisis period 2007–2009 
outcomes. The study finds a negative relationship between executive compensation and 
profitability, as measured by ROA and ROE. There is found a negative association with 
firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q, and managerial compensation. The results show 
that applying corporate governance; a high valued CEO decrease firm performance or 
value. 
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KEYWORDS: corporate governance, executive pay, CEO compensation, firm 
performance 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this master’s thesis, I investigate CEO compensation and incentives and how they 
associate to firm financial performance in 1993–2016. The paper discusses CEO 
compensation; however, the discussion covers as well as another executive’s 
compensation as a whole subject. The duties of the executives are developing the firm 
strategy and business model, as well as; they oversee the operative management of the 
corporation. Executives require monetary compensation for their work as do other 
employees. Instead, executive compensation is more considerable than daily management 
incentives, yet the determination of the packages might be divergent. The terms of 
compensation packages must obey their level and structure to attract, retain, and motivate 
experienced executives to gain shareholder or stakeholder value as high as possible. The 
compensation program has accepted by the compensation committee and the independent 
directors of the board. The common impression of executive compensation is that it has 
spurred to executives behave in a short-term goal instead of long duration in firm success.  
(Larcker & Tayan 2016: 211.) 
 
CEO, along with executive compensation, has shown a remarkable association with firm 
profitability and valuation. Mehran (1995) found that executive compensation can 
improve firm performance when they use equity-based and the portion of shared held the 
executives. Additionally, Mehran (1995) found that the form of the pay is prior than the 
level of compensation to drive executives to upturn the value of a business. Additionally, 
Brick, Palmon, and Wald (2006) paper support that executive compensation is highly 
associated with the monitoring and effort needs of executives to confirm value growth. 
Furthermore, the paper discoveries a significant positive association among CEO and 
director compensation which can due to the omitted variables or to overcompensation of 
executives and managers related to weak monitoring Correspondingly the, papers by 
Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011), likewise Correa and Lel (2016) found rather a 
negative association than a positive association among firm performance and CEO 
compensation. Besides, a paper by Khan and Vieito (2013) did not found a notable 
relationship between CEO compensation and firm financial performance.  
 
Interesting of this study is to find out how CEO pay is associated with firm performance 
measured by ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q. The paper uses primarily the most common 
features of executives’ compensation, which are CEO salary and bonus. Additionally, the 
third variable to define CEO compensation is other compensation variable which consists 
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of, for example, employee benefits and other personal benefits, the share of payments, 
life insurances, tax allowances, cut-price share acquisitions, consulting benefits, and 
rewards for charitable awards programs. (Compustat Execucomp 2018.) 
 
 
1.1 Purpose of the study 
 
The purpose of the thesis is to examine how CEO compensation effect to stock return 
association in S&P 500 stock exchange. I am using annual data from the S&P 500 
exchange and executive compensation database for the period from January 1993 to 
December 2016. The time period is 24 years and I aim for investigating how the executive 
compensation association to firm financial performance is changed with time. The paper 
uses the longest possible period for CEO compensation which is provided from the 
Compustat Execucomp database. As in the research papers what this piece of work 
investigates, there are differences between the CEOs and the companies’ results at the 
beginning of the review period and correspondingly the last part has different results 
among compensation and firm performance. It depends on issues as time or location (e.g., 
Mehran 1995; Correa & Lel 2016; Tarkovska 2017). However, the research papers are 
described in the literature review in the fourth chapter. This paper looks at is there found 
link between CEO’s compensation in firm financial performance. I am investigating how 
well executive compensation reflects firm financial value and profitability using 
statistical methods. 
 
Executives can be related to superheroes who work hard, and they are paid well for that 
hard work. They are chosen to their position after the specific experience, education, and 
characteristics which top-level executive’s need. They are chosen from many candidates 
and that’s why they might be meriting to get high remuneration of extremely challenging 
duty, and the time what they spend to develop the firm financial expansion to the best of 
their ability. Salas (2010) investigated how managerial entrenchment affects to stock 
return. Entrenchment can be defined as an executive who has more power and is more 
valuable prestige than other managers. They might have a long career in a specific firm 
and has improved a company success with their contribution. Managerial entrenchment 
is hard to measure but it can be related to prior studies. For example, CEO age, CEO 
tenure and CEO career experience can be used to be proxies for entrenchment. (Salas 
2010.) 
 
 
11 
 
 
1.2 Research problem 
 
A research question in this paper is how executive compensation is associated with the 
condition of firm financial performance in the United States exchange market S&P 500. 
This paper attempts to find the answer to this question and find their affiliation between 
those two constituents. Executives reward might be indeed a vast and thesis tries to solve 
is there inherently positive, negative, or no association between those to economic 
success. The paper attempt to look for an answer can large executive compensation 
package create value to share- or stakeholder.  
 
This paper research problem originates the possible association between those two 
possessions where executive compensation has been called unreasonable into question 
when an economic stroke has abated, but companies’ executives still are rewarded in a 
huge compensation package. (Bainbridge 2012.) 
 
 
1.3 Structure of the study 
 
Structure of the paper is following. Next chapter after this introduction part is background 
and motivation where corporate governance and executive compensation concepts are 
covered at a general level. Following part includes information on academic publications 
which are related to this paper research theme. Additionally, the hypothesis is introduced 
in that chapter. Following is the data and methodology description part where is explained 
the empirical research instructions what is used in regression analysis. The next part 
contains empirical results and findings of the research. There is the first section where 
three different independent variables are investigated separately, and the second sections 
use different periods to investigate results and differences in those outcomes. To addition, 
the results in the pre-crisis period 2004–2006 and the crisis period 2007–2009 is shown 
at the end of the paragraph. The last section is a summary and conclusion where ideas are 
put together. After that is the reference list.  
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2. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
 
Four covered topics are related to this paper subject. They are corporate governance, 
agency theory, executive compensation, and chief executive officer. To addition, the last 
chapters are about criticism of the study and the impact of cultural differences and 
compensation growth. The last chapter includes two figures, which illustrates the impact 
of compensation, cultural differences, and compensation growth. The following part 
explains these topics, which are essential to the paper background and motivation.   
 
 
2.1 Corporate governance 
 
Used definition of corporate governance resides with the established composition, legal 
rules, and best practices that regulate which assembly of delegates is authorized to make 
specific decisions, how the assembly of delegates are chosen, and the standards that ought 
to direct decision making. Principles of corporate governance descend from multiple 
sources, and as a result of this includes multiple forms. Governance principles are based 
on rules of practice, which is based on social norms, laws enforced privately through 
reputational sanctions or economic processes. Corporate governance target is to make 
sure that the right questions get questioned and that checks and balances in a spot to secure 
that the answers mirror what is best for the making of a durable, maintainable and 
renewable value of the company. Best practice means corporate governance methods 
which are merely aspirational. Part of corporate governance comes from the hard law of 
corporation statues and judicial opinions which are enforced by legal sanctions. 
(Bainbridge 2012: 2.) 
 
On the whole, bases as mentioned above, cooperatively identify the ends the firm is 
founded to pursue and the purpose why they carry on business. The corporation 
determines the contents of rules and practices for making a decision on corporate affairs, 
how rights and responsibilities are disseminated among different constitutions, and how 
they monitor the performance of those constitutions. Altogether corporate governance 
contains tools, methods, and affairs by which organizations are controlled and directed. 
(Bainbridge 2012: 2.) 
 
A research paper by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) examine the importance of 
corporate governance in firm valuation between the years from 1990 to 2003. They use 
monthly returns in the S&P 500 market, which includes information on between 1400 
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and 1800 firms. The paper follows Investor Responsible Research Center (IRRC), which 
includes 24 provisions and two different governance indices in instruction. Corporate 
governance is measured typically in a different variation of indices. For example, 
Bebchuk et al. paper use a six-provision entrenchment index, E-index, which includes 
staggered boards, limits to shareholder improvements of the bylaws, overall majority 
qualifications for mergers and overall majority qualifications for concession 
improvements, shareholder rights plan and golden parachute adjustments. 
Correspondingly, the second method is G or GIM-index is used in Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick paper (2003). A board-based governance index contains information of 1500 U.S 
firms in the years 1990–1999 in their paper. They combine 24 different divisions of the 
same sort characteristics as E-index contains. 
 
 
2.2 Agency problem 
 
In this chapter, I define a problem in corporate finance, which has a strong influence on 
corporate governance how to contend with the problem of managerial compensation and 
performance measurement. The agency problem is defined that the firm’s managers 
might have personal incentives which might deviate shareholders principle to maximize 
assets’ value. Managers personal interest and exterior investors financial objectives can 
be obsessed with a different kind of wealth maximizing. For example, principals are 
seeking to maximize their wealth when correspondingly agent attempt to get personal 
benefits what might be, for example, an expensive fancy company car.  In agent problem, 
shareholders are assorted to be owners of a company, and managers are assorted to be 
employees of the company. The issue of an agency problem is that the manager has the 
power to affect the firm financial performance. Top management should try to ensure that 
middle management and employees have the right enticements to discover invest in 
profitable projects (Brealey, Stewart & Allen 2017: 302). 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) proposed the first invention of agency theory in their paper. 
They investigated the theory of managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership 
structure. Especially, CEO compensation for incentive reason association with firm 
performance was their specific interest in the paper. The paper finds out large firms’ 
tendency to use equity-based compensation or bonuses models which are connected to 
performance. Large firms can be expected to get more that kind of rewards. Additionally, 
executives of large firms seem to receive a higher amount of compensation compared to 
small firms’ executives. (Jensen & Meckling 1976.) 
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Bealey, Stewart, and Allen (2017) determine five intentions why it is challenging to 
develop incentives correct shape through a sizeable organization. First, top management 
cannot analyze every project during the year. They have no method to know enough 
details of each one projects to make intellectual select. Second, the investment project 
configuration includes investment decisions that top executives cannot monitor every 
alternative that was considered, which can also be rejected by the project financier. Third, 
plenty of capital investment does not appear in the capital financial plan. For example, 
several projects contain research and development, employee tuition, and advertising 
expenses considered to expand a market or acquire the contented customer.  Fourth, 
operating management may carry extra inventories of raw material what they will not 
have to worry about laying in stores. They might buy new equipment through the firm 
has previous devices which might be proper to use. Several minor acquisitions 
accumulate noteworthy real money.  Fifth, the executive might be a target to the 
equivalent types of attractions that afflict a lower level of organization (Brealey et al. 
2017: 302–303). 
 
The main issue is in agency theory, how can firm owners do monitor over company 
management. A shareholder is challenging to control what the management employee is 
undertaking. A firm can use various type methods to control over management, but some 
methods are difficult to exercise because of the high costs. The methods can be incentive 
schemes and contracts, remuneration contracts, and exploit their voting rights. (Solomon 
2004: 17–21.) 
 
 
2.3 Executive compensation 
 
Executive’s primary duties are developing the firm strategy and business model and 
oversee the operational management of the corporation from which they require monetary 
compensation for their effort. Structure of the compensation needs to be appropriate in 
term of their level and composition to arouse, maintain and inspire authorized executives 
to increase shareholder and stakeholder worth. The compensation program is permitted 
by the compensation committee and the directors of the board. Compensation plan 
discussion is done in cooperation with the human resources and finance departments and 
external compensation consultants. Sovereign directors of the board votes to 
compensation packages to be accepted. Equity-based compensation structures need to be 
obliged to follow the ayes of shareholders. In the annual report is explained the further 
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information of the compensation plan, which includes the fair value of the total 
compensation aimed at the executives in the last three years. There is information on 
values realized by concerned executives through the realized or conferring of equity-
based remunerations. The challenge of the compensation program is to make sure that the 
decisions made by the CEO or the other executive are in the long-term interest of 
shareholders. The precise quantity of compensation to be accepted is the smallest quantity 
it needs to fascinate and maintain a skilled executive. However, the labor market for 
senior executives does not represent to be excellent efficient since there is possibility 
difference between supply and demand. Additionally, there might be trouble in estimating 
the excellence of applicants. Then a board has the challenge to recognize the right 
executive and market compensation what needs to fascinate those applicants. 
Furthermore, a member of the board may arrange deficient control when the 
compensation committee is planning frame of compensation. The problem can be because 
of an absence of autonomy, deficient engagement, or deficiency of authority comparative 
to the executive. Because of those issues, the executive compensation package might be 
distorted in term of both size and structure.  (Larcker & Tayan 2015: 211–2013.) 
 
Executive compensation appeared a contentious issue in the last decade. Many business 
stakeholders as politicians, regulators, an activist shareholder, and host of other opinion 
makers and ordinary citizens in common with grumbled corporate executives who are 
getting ever wealthier while the economy grappled. For instance, American politicians 
have criticized chief executives who are earning in 10 minutes more money than regular 
employees gain in a year. Recently executive compensation regulations have become 
tighter than in past decades. However, one can have criticized that is these arrangements 
addressed to actual corporate governance failures or is they purely a provision to majority 
reprimand.  One can moreover question whether the latest controls are expected to be 
successful (Bainbridge 2012: 109).  
 
The polemics of executive compensation begin from the 1930s in the U.S business 
economy. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has enhanced the control of 
executive compensation further the present from the 1930s economic recession. The 
1930s recession invite criticism, which was primarily targeted for the compensation paid 
to executives of the industrial or financial high-flyers. A million-dollar compensation was 
considered to be limit what no one can be more worth in a year. The executive 
compensation growth remains unchanged until the 1980s when the lines of thought turn 
inside out by rapid economic growth and high inflation rate. At that period from the 1940s 
to end of the 1970s high marginal earnings taxes aided to reduce the total largeness of 
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executive compensation. The top-level executive would pay more than 70% of taxes of 
his or her incomes. A compensation structure change from fixed salaries and annual 
bonuses to a variable pay bound by long-term accomplishment goal and stock options. 
Fork out an increase above 10 million dollars in the 1980s. However, in the 1990s and 
2000s, the endemic assumption of stock options intensifies the issue, and the executives’ 
pay out exceeded a billion mark in that period. (Larcker & Tayan 2015: 212–213.) 
 
Nevertheless, during the financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent recession, executive 
compensation standard declined. Regardless, after the end of the downturn, the upward 
tension begins again and pay out standards achieved recent peaks. (Larcker & Tayan 
2015: 212–213.)  
 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) examine pay-performance and top-management incentives 
relation. They include a pay-performance observation salary, options, stockholding, and 
discharge. Their sample period is from 1974 to 1986 and data of over 2000 executives 
listed in the Executive Compensation Surveys. Surveys include information on the CEO 
of more than 1000 companies for a total of roughly 10 400 CEO-years of data. Data is 
from the U.S firms. The paper result in a CEO and pay-performance relation shows that 
CEO wealth turns into 3.25 dollars for every 1000-dollar change in shareholder wealth. 
However, as the research by Jensen et al. (1990) and Yarram and Rice (2017) strengthens 
for an optimal contracting concept where the market for the management-labor market is 
reasonable, and the executive reward is solved by a set of financial issues relating to firms 
and CEOs.   
 
Murphy (2003) investigate firms compensation packages nine years’ time period from 
1992 to 2001. He defines in this paper "new economy" firms which are small in turnover, 
but they have high market value. Besides, Murphy (2003) state that those firms tend to 
count on equity-based compensation. Notably, they offer in high likelihood stock options 
or restricted stock to executives whereas "old economy" firms abide by traditional 
compensation products. 
 
Executives compensation includes bonuses, non-monetary rewards, or other financial 
compensation given to top-level executives for their loyalty and achieving the given 
duties and responsibilities. Additionally, executive compensation is what they will 
reward; then, they achieve appointed results for the corporation. There are several variant 
forms to consist the offset such as cash payoff, annual bonus, option grants, retirement 
packages, executive perks, and long-term incentive plans. The cash payment is annual 
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salary what executive regularly get in the year. It is imposed at the beginning of the year. 
The annual bonus is supplementary payment, which is in most cases in the form of the 
cash award is the annual firm performance surpass specified financial and nonfinancial 
target. Its amount is disclosed as a percentage of fixed salary and can contain an assured 
lowest and highest amount. The option grant is derivative, which is defined as the right 
to buy or sell shares in the future at a fixed exercise price. A stock option is often equal 
to the stock price on the grant date. Option grants have entrusting requirements and expire 
after ten years. A firm might implement a requirement to hold requirements as hold to 
retirement or hold past retirements.  These requirements are aimed at long-term 
ownership and are proposed to support the executive’s interests with the interests of 
shareholders. Additionally, option grants can be restricted stock or performance shares 
units which the first is a straight grant of shares that are controlled in term of 
transferability and are the issue to time-based entrusting timetable. The second of 
previously mentioned is equity awards, which are granted merely after specific financial 
or nonfinancial targets are reached during a three-to-five-year term. The rest of the 
executive compensation package can be perquisites, contractual agreements, or other 
benefits. (Raviv & Sisli-Ciamarra 2013; Larcker et al. 2015: 214–215.) 
 
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) paper examine managerial incentives and risk-taking 
in the U.S firms in time 1992–2002. They find that management compensation is 
associated with higher sensitivity to the volatility of share prices, encouraging firm key 
people to accept risky investments. Furthermore, adjusting the sensitivity of CEO wealth 
to performance (delta), using modeling and econometric solutions for the endogenous 
response consequences of company risk and policy decisions they discovered the higher 
sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility (vega) implements riskier policy decisions 
investing more to research and development and investing less in property, plant, and 
equipment. Moreover, after adjusting vega, management seems to concentrate on fewer 
business areas and higher leverage. (Coles, Daniel & Naveen 2006.) 
 
Executive compensation, which is structured and implemented by the board of directors 
and compensation committee, is influenced by the compensation strategy. That is based 
on the legislation of executive compensation, public opinion, and the opinions of the 
company’s personnel. Compensation level and structure must be personalized for the 
CEOs individual characteristics as well as firm features. Other influences defining the 
level and structure of CEO compensation are monetary benefits and living environment. 
Companies that are in contaminated, excessive crime level, or nasty geographical position 
pay higher compensation to their CEOs. However, the likelihood to pay higher 
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compensation is more significant when the CEO is hired outside, and when the CEO has 
short-term career concerns. One of the most typical conducts to evaluate executive 
compensation plan is to pay versus performance contrast. It helps firms to detect whether 
their CEO is overpaid or not. The method to detect that is to look at the change in annual 
executive pay change and compare to the annual stock price. In other words, with the 
executive compensation change in reward goes over the change in share price, the 
executive compensation will be considered as an overpayment. (Deng & Gao 2013; 
Becker 2006.) 
 
Likewise, the alternative to pay versus performance method to estimate CEO 
compensation proposal is to liken to his or her peers in the equivalent industry. While the 
compensation level of CEOs for market leaders and firm founders can be slightly higher 
in contrast. However, executives or managers compensation levels in the same industry 
are comparable. In other words, firms typically admit higher compensations for the 
founder of the corporation or a high-class CEO than other executives or managers. On 
the other hand, if an executive who is not the founder of the firm and earning as much 
compensation than the founder, he or she can be denoted to be overpaid. (Bolton, Mehran 
& Shapiro 2015.) 
 
 
2.4 Chief Executive Officer 
 
A Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is the top-level executive who has a responsibility of 
firm daily leading and who do major corporate decisions making. Additionally, a person 
who be the leader of the overall operations which serves as the most critical 
communication point between the board of directors and firm operations. A CEO is not 
only always executive but also occasionally chairman of the board. When all investors, 
lenders, customers and other shareholders desire whom they would want to be a CEO, 
they likelihood desires he or she to be executive who forecast the upcoming events and 
lead the firm appropriately. So, people want the CEO who is capable of superior quality, 
experience, reserves, incentive, and influence to keep the firm prepared for change and 
guide the substantial advantage from changes. He or she needs to be sufficiently 
authoritative to meet expectations and liable to secure it is done correctly. The main 
challenge for the all corporate governance member is to secure that the choices made by 
the managing directors are in the long-range interests of the shareholders. (Monks & 
Minow 2011: 354.) 
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Firms have a request for skilled a CEO who can manage a business at the top-level. The 
labor market for chief executives is the place where supply and demand of the virtue of 
ability are balanced to find a person who handles these responsibilities correctly. So, in 
order to the selection of the CEO to be done correctly, information need be open on the 
demand of the firm and the virtue of the ability of the persons applying to perform in the 
top-level executive characters.  (Larcker et al. 2015.) 
 
CEO pay is made up typically from two components: base salary and annual bonus plans. 
Base salary is formed over general industry salary surveys which are augmented by 
detailed analysis of selected industrial or market users. The surveys are arranged, for 
instance, a firm size which can be based on turnover or market value. Nonetheless, CEOs 
base salaries are essential constituents of the CEO contract of employment. The fact is 
that even the base salary should be fixed, risk-averse CEOs will prefer a demand for 
higher wages to base salary rather than goal bonus or inconstant compensation. Annual 
bonus plans are made up for profit-aiming firms’ executives for a fiscal year. They are 
paid based on an annual performance targeting to motivate top executives to achieve 
organizational performance for a year. (Murphy 1999: 2497–2499.) 
 
Nevertheless, grandeur and dominance of CEO bonuses, they are often articulated in the 
firm proxy report on flimsy grounds. CEO bonus plans can be sorted in three ways: 
performance measures, performance standards, and the arrangement of the pay-
performance association. However, subject to the payment of the bonus is that at least the 
performance requirement is reached.  Performance measures are presented as a proportion 
of the performance objective standard or target bonuses.  Those are granted for reaching 
the performance standard. (Murphy 1999: 2497–2499.) 
 
Additionally, granted bonuses have an upper limit, which is a proportion or numerous of 
the target bonus. The scope among the least and upper limit reward is considered to be 
the incitement district where additional expansion in performance reflects additional 
enhancement in bonuses. (Murphy 1999: 2497–2499.) 
 
Morse, Nanda, and Seru (2011) investigate compensation contracts rigged by powerful 
CEOs in the U.S in the time period 2001–2003. They present that the board of director’s 
responsibility is to counsel and observe managerial directors working in a way that causes 
better shareholder safety reducing agency problems. When a board is comparatively 
weak, the CEO can exploit primary leading position in the firm. Correspondingly, active 
board, and stronger governance between other aspects reduce powerful CEO drawback. 
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Additionally, a powerful CEO, which is besides a member of the director, can readily be 
self-seeking executive. Morse et al. (2011) find out that powerful CEOs has a more 
extensive salary and returns from the rigging. Dominant CEOs are an insensitive stage to 
rig compensation contracts against a weak board. 
 
 
2.5 Criticism of the CEO compensation 
 
CEO incentive has caused criticism among shareholder and academic discussion. They 
have represented CEO pay being dedicated to the absence of suitable incentives for a 
better result, and relevant take the consequences for the pitiable result. Additionally, 
reducing CEO pay levels have been suggested by the shareholders and academic 
discussion. The proposed alternative for CEO pay is in terms of increasing the 
relationship between pay and performance, for instance, using the form of stock options. 
(Murphy 1999: 2515.) 
 
After the economic failure in 2008, a new period of executive compensation instigated. 
The disaster of notorious investment services caused the economic failure as Lehman 
Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns, and AIG. The compensation authorities identified 
that executive compensation was both the sign and the cause of the uncertainty that 
occurred in the financial sector. Consequently, executive compensation got increased 
attention, which caused an incredible level of involvement by the federal government in 
regulating the structure and disclosure of executive pay. Primary to be concerned by the 
new regulation, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 and the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, were associations that were obtaining financial 
support through the Treasury Department’s Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). 
They turn out to be the issue to numerous remarkable of gradually an aggressive 
constriction on CEO compensation. However, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (the Act) was authorized into law that had a straight and 
noteworthy influence on the executives, directors, shareholders, and publicly traded 
corporations. The Acts have influenced significantly to requirements connected to 
executive compensation and corporate governance, i.e., the discovery of mistakenly 
granted compensation, executive compensation bulletin, and internal pay capital, bulletin 
observing executive and director hedging, polling by brokers, CEO duality and 
compensation committee independence. To conclude, firms have been relatively 
permitted to select the CEO compensation quantity and construction, but after the recent 
events, restrictions have been imposed on it. (Schneider 2011.) 
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Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1994) investigated CEO compensation monitoring and firm 
performance in the U.S market in the period 1982–1986. Their data is from the Compustat 
database. Fama (1980) examined agency problems and the theory of the firm where a 
common consideration for monitoring practices is that it has a positive connection with 
firm performance. Rivalry among companies coerces into doing intensive censoring the 
achievement of the whole group and separate managers. Additionally, Fama (1980) states 
that the incentive problems to be because of decision making in a firm is delegated to 
executives who are not the shareholders of the firm. Executives come up against restraint 
and prospects offered by inside an external surface the company by the marketplace. 
Respectively, Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1994) found demanding monitoring or relying 
solely on monitoring might have disadvantage effects. Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1994) 
discovered intense monitoring had hesitated the alignments of agent and principals’ 
interest, which consequences decreasing returns from monitoring. Monitoring mostly 
appears operating with fixed and conditional incentive following the interest of the 
executive and shareholders. (Fama 1989; Tosi & Gomez-Mejia 1994.) 
 
 
2.6 The impact of cultural differences and compensation growth 
 
Locations, with comparable economic structures and there are regular transmissions of 
expatriates, can use combined an average of expatriate compensation package into one 
united area for the intention of making the balance sheet adjustments. This combination 
method permits the firm to make retrenchment adjustments which effect in significantly 
lesser depreciation than a standard balance sheet and is inexpensive than the parent 
company scheme. However, those firms that use do not put the overseas premiums to the 
compensation package, below the way of thinking that the general level of cultures in 
those countries are parallel. Think about the business and cultural discrepancy among 
Denmark and Norway. They are indisputably vital but more challenging is to adjust the 
expatriate assignment between the U.S and Japan. Besides, countries that have a 
remarkable volume of transfers among countries, then the level of compensation 
differences increases. (Lomax 2001: 215.) 
 
 
Figure 1. Median CEO compensation in 2013 for large companies. Brealey et al., 2017: 
307.   
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Figure 2. Evolution in compensation of the CEOs of firms in the S&P 500 Index in 1992–
2013. Brealey et al., 2017: 307.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The compensation level and structure of the managing directors vary between countries 
which are presented in figure one. Comparing the median pay of top executives in large 
firms, the U.S. has had remarkably higher levels of CEO pay, as they receive two times 
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the pay of France CEOs and over ten times the compensation of Chinese CEOs. A 
noteworthy portion of the CEO compensation in the U.S. and Canada come from variable 
bonuses, stock options, as well as long-term incentive plans and they, are 
comprehensively dependent on performance, whereas the Eurozone compensation 
appears to be composed typically of base salary and target bonus. Additional discovery 
is that Chinese and Japanese CEOs get notably compensated less than CEOs in other 
countries, which might be connected to the management ethos in those countries. 
However, managerial director compensation in the U.S decreased during the 2008–2009 
financial crisis, which is shown in figure two. There has been a steady upward trend in 
compensation. Managerial director growth has come mostly from the pay of stocks and 
options. CEO pay has got great distress about excessive pay for the moderate result. 
Highly rewarded CEO may leave behind problematic and floundering firms after an 
announcement of causeless excessive compensation. Excessive compensation often 
reflects more significant problems with the firm’s economic situation. As you can see in 
the second figure below, compensating levels decreased around global recessions in 
2001–2002 and 2008–2009. (Brealey et al. 2017: 307–308.) 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 
 
The subsequent literature review paragraph includes details of the following topics: 
corporate governance and financial performance, executive compensation, and firm 
performance, and CEO compensation and firm performance. Additionally, hypotheses 
are shown after the literature review part. The thesis contains the null hypothesis, the first 
alternative hypothesis, and the second alternative hypothesis which are shown in the last 
chapter. 
 
 
3.1 Corporate governance and financial performance 
 
Bhagat and Bolton (2008) investigate corporate governance, especially the relationship 
between corporate governance and corporation financial performance. The sample period 
is 1990–2004 in the U.S stock market. The data consists of control variables, other 
endogenous variables, performance variables, and other variables. They use the annual 
accounting data where performance measure is ROA and Tobin’s Q. The governance 
variables are a different type of indices or variables as CEO chair-duality, CEO 
ownership, board size, CEO age, and CEO tenure. The indices were GIM and BCF, which 
measure the goodness of corporate governance. The paper includes the endogeneity of 
the relationship between corporate governance, capital structure, and corporate ownership 
structure. They find that governance indices, stock ownership of board members, and 
CEO-chair split-up are significantly positively associated with firm financial 
performance. 
 
Additionally, the paper Bhagat and Bolton (2008) found that the likelihood of regulated 
management turnover can improve the stock ownership of board members. The paper 
investigates, and it shows a negative association to firm current and the time to come 
performance. Altogether, the paper states that enhanced corporate governance is 
associated with current and future operating performance. However, the time to come 
stock market performance is not associated with either a positive or negative association 
to any of governance characteristics.  
 
Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001) found that a CEO was firing for the evidence of 
reduced performance, which has become more widespread. They discover that the 
recurrence of obligatory CEO turnover was doubled between the period of 1983 to 1994 
when they compare it to the likelihood between the years from 1971 to 1982. 
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Additionally, Huson et al. (2001) found that when a CEO was designated after mandatory 
CEO turnover, the new managing director was more probable to be recruited from outside 
of the firm in the second research period. However, they examined that modifications in 
the strength of the takeover market are not connected by modifications in the delicacy of 
turnover of managing director to company performance. Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino 
(2004) investigated a similar topic and focused on managerial succession and firm 
performance in the U.S in the period from 1971 to 1994. The median heir is a 53 years 
old personage, and tenure has been around 19 years, and 19% of just hired CEOs are 
externals. They investigated the period after managerial director turnover 
accomplishment enhancements appeared to follow firms that hired external CEOs. So, 
investors can interiorize managing director turnover notice as performance developments.  
 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) examine in their paper governance index association 
to firm value. Higher G-index value strikes good corporate governance. They use Tobin’s 
Q as a measure of financial performance. Their U.S data sample period is from 1990 to 
1990. They find a positive connection between corporate governance and firm value. To 
be precise, they compare firms with weak and strong shareholder rights and find that 
substantial shareholder rights lead to advanced firm valuation, sales growth, and inferior 
capital expenditure. Correspondingly, weak shareholder rights lead to inferior revenues, 
inferior sales growth, higher capital costs, and an upper quantity of corporate acquisitions.  
The difference between weak and robust shareholder right to firm performance is 8,5% 
by a year. Additionally, the index upturn is related to a lower value for Tobin’s Q. That 
amount upturns until the end of the sample period and associated lower value for Tobin’s 
Q. 
 
Bebchuk et al. (2009) investigates corporate governance related to firm value using the 
IRRC and the governance index in the sample period 1990–2003 using the U.S stocks 
data. They use an advanced version of the IRRC and governance index where they add 
them entrenchment characteristics to their version. They found that development in 
corporate governance is associated with a sharp decrease in firm value. Furthermore, 
higher governance index value causes substantial negative abnormal revenues. They find 
that entrenchment provisions are negatively associated with firm valuation. Additionally, 
they say shareholder and their consultant to be a better focus on the main corporate 
governance provisions that highly matter for firm value.  
 
Erkens, Hung, and Matos (2012) examine corporate governance in the financial crisis 
between the years 2007 and 2008. The sample consists of 296 finance companies which 
26 
 
 
are worldwide from 30 nations. They find out that financial companies that have an 
independent board and greater ownership of institutional possession experience reduce 
the performance within the financial crisis. The paper uses a buy-and-hold strategy to 
measure stock returns. The higher level of risk-taking explains the inferior stock returns 
by institutional ownership, but they cannot explain the reason behind that. However, it 
can be settled by the amount of equity. A paper shows that firm performance may change 
under a financial crisis. Altogether, the paper states that companies with a more 
significant number of independent boards increased equity significantly measured by 
total assets in time period 2007–2008.  
 
Ammann, Oesch, and Schmid (2011) examine corporate governance and firm value using 
an international point of view. They have a sizable dataset which consists of information 
of 22 developed countries, 6663 observations and 2300 firms in the time period 2003–
2007. The proxy to measure the quality of corporate governance is Governance Metrics 
International (GMI) where data is collected from the U.S and non-U.S firms altogether 
reaching the MSCI Worlds and the MSCI EAFE index. The paper is searching 
relationship among firm-level corporate governance and firm value. They developed an 
index of the set of 64 governance characteristics which are equally weighted in research. 
 
Additionally, Ammann et al. (2011) have two alternative indices which are slightly 
modified versions of the first index. The results state that internal corporate governance 
and firm value have a statistically significant positive association. Consequently, the 
finding supports an idea that decent corporate governance might help with agency 
problems which affect positively to firm value. Furthermore, the paper investigates a 
corporate’s social responsibility. They find a strong positive relationship among a 
corporation’s social responsibility and firm value. Besides, the implementation price 
implementation of corporate governance is smaller than the monitoring benefits and 
developing advanced cash flows accumulating to shareholders and lower costs of capital. 
 
 
3.2 Executive compensation and firm performance 
 
One of the earlier researches of executive compensation is a research paper by Mehran 
Hamid (1995). His study examines executive compensation structure, ownership and firm 
performance between the years from 1979 to 1980 The data consists of 153 randomly 
selected manufacturing firms. He found that firm performance is positively associated 
with the proportion of equity held by executives and to the proportion of their 
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compensation that is equity-based. He uses Tobin’s Q and ROA to measure firm 
performance. Under these circumstances, compensation affects the CEO’s motivations in 
methods that have a significant impact on the company’s efficiency. Additionally, he 
finds a shred of intercessor evidence that supports incentive remuneration and he 
recommend the form of the compensation package is more important than the level of 
compensation to drive executives to increase firm value. Altogether, the paper state that 
executive compensation is a virtuous subject and it can growth firm performance when 
one uses equity-based and the percentage of shares held by executives. Moreover, the 
paper results endorse the present compensation structure that is gradually focused on 
equity-based compensation and other durable executive pay policies even data is 
comparatively old. 
 
Leonard Jonathan (1990) paper investigates executive pay and firm performance in 1981–
1985. The paper sample consists of 439 large U.S firms’ data. Firm performance is 
measured by ROE in the paper. The paper mention tournament theory which states that 
salary or compensation differences are reasonable because of absolute differences are 
more reasonable than percentage differences. It is important to create better heterogeneity 
at the firm higher management level. The author discovers higher positive association 
among long-time compensation packages and ROE than firms without such 
compensation packages. Up to the end of the sample period, large firms have agreed 
compensation packages introduction. Today is more common that firms have adopted 
incentive plans to managers than in the 1980s. Overall, compensation plans are an 
important method for motive executives to increase firm performance.   
 
A study by Kato and Long (2006) examines executive compensation, firm performance 
and corporate governance relationship in China exchange market where the sample firms 
are listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets. They focus on the paper is 
privately and state-owned companies. The research period is from 1998 to 2002. They 
found statistically significant sympathies and elasticities in China of annual cash 
compensation including salary and bonus for a top executive in regard to owners’ value. 
To put it more accurately, sales growth appears to be associated positively with executive 
compensation. However, Chinese executives are punished for unprofitable performance 
and they are punished for lessening returns nor compensated for growing returns. 
Additionally, state-owned firms decline the pay-performance relation for executives due 
to agency problem to be more challenging to concerned firms. 
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Bebchuk et al. (2011) investigate in their paper how does the CEO pay slice (CPS) affects 
to firm financial performance. More specifically, they examine the value, performance 
and the behavior of public firms’ and the importance of the CEO and other executives. 
The CPS variable definition is a percentage of the total compensation to top five 
executives which goes to the CEO. Compensations can be salary bonuses, other annual 
pay, the total value of restricted stock granted that year, Black and Scholes value of stock 
options granted that year or long-term incentive layouts. They use U.S firms’ data 
between 1993 and 2004.  Data includes 12011 firm observation, 2015 firms, and 3256 
different CEOs. Their compensation data is provided by Compustat’s Execucomp 
database and other databases what they used is Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) and IRRC.  They use the panel regression method to determine CPS effects to 
firm financial performance. Tobin’s Q is the main market-based performance measure, 
and another is the return of asset (ROA) which is an accounting-based performance 
measure. The CPS is firm-year annually dated data which includes the total compensation 
of every year. The paper findings are that the CPS in negatively associated to the value 
of a company measured by Tobin’s Q. Therefore, superstar CEOs reduce the company’s 
value. Bebchuk et al. (2011) discover that the CPS negatively connected to profitability 
which is measured by ROA. Altogether, the paper suggests that too large compensation 
causes less profitability and valuation of firm measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA. Thus, 
the research states that corporation should be careful to pay too large compensations to 
executives. 
 
A paper by Correa and Lel (2016) examines the relationship between Say of Pay laws, 
executive compensation, pay slice, and firm valuation around the world. The sample 
includes data from 38 countries in time period 2001–2012. Data contains countries like 
the U.S., the U.K., Germany, Canada, and Japan and they have been accumulated from 
the S&P Capital IQ (CIQ) database which includes information on global executive 
compensation in 119 countries. Data is converted into U.S dollars. Say of pay (SoP) laws 
dummy is used in the paper. When it equals to one it means that for the time period 
executive compensation is following the corporate law of shareholder right to vote 
executive pay slice and zero otherwise. SoP laws are defined to be an exogenous shock 
to find the effect of CEO pay slice to firm valuation. As in Bebchuk et al. (2011) paper 
total CEO pay is total annual compensation of the top executive and the CEO pay slice is 
the proportion of the CEO pay of the top five executives. The paper findings are the CEO 
compensation evolution is inferior in the period following the adoption of SoP laws. The 
results are more visible to firms with problematic pay practices and weak corporate 
governance setting in the pre-SoP law period and the executive pay disparity reduce after 
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SoP adoption is over. The effects are concerted in corporations with high excess pay and 
shareholder disagree, extensive CEO tenure and less independent boards. Altogether, the 
paper state that SoP laws are affected to changes in CEO pay policies and the association 
has a significant effect. Moreover, the paper reveals a negative association between CPS 
and firm performance. (Correa & Lel 2016.) 
 
Executive compensation is not purely examined in the U.S market instead there are 
publications of the other continent explorations. A paper by Buigut, Soi and Koskei 
(2014) considers determinants of CEO compensation in the United Kingdom (U.K) in the 
years from 2008 to 2010. They include details of the 20 firms in their sample. The used 
methodology is a multiple regression model. In the paper CEO compensation is positively 
associated with firm profitability in addition to managing directors pay growth due to the 
company’s performance. It is required for companies to combine firm and individual 
performance rewards to combat the agency’s problems. Additionally, the paper finds that 
CEO ownership has a positive and significant association to executive compensation. One 
other association is the percentage of independent executives is associated negatively to 
CEOs compensation level.  The wide CEOs’ ownership gives higher wage levels to a 
base wage, equity compensation, and discretionary compensation. Discretionary 
compensation means an award what is not planned to be given, but it is given to 
unexpected success which company achieves. (Buigut, Soi & Koskei 2014.) 
 
Another research of the U.K executive compensation is an article by Al-Najjar, Ding and 
Hussainey (2016) where they especially focus on the CEO pay slice characteristics in 
2003–2009. The study is mostly comparable to Bebchuk et al. (2011) paper. The main 
difference to Bebchuk et al. (2011) paper is the findings which are on the opposite side. 
They find advanced CPS has a positive relationship firm performance when they limit the 
firm-specific characteristics and corporate governance effects. Besides they investigated 
that CEO duality and large board size variables are associates negatively to CPS 
magnitude. Altogether, the study gives the impression that executive compensation can 
be related to executive skills rather than authority and great executive compensation can 
be valuable.  
 
Comparable an article is Tarkovska’s (2017) research where she examines CPS in the 
U.K between 1997 and 2010. The paper data consist of non-financial firms from the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE). The paper topic examines the association between CPS 
and the value of the firms in the U.K.  More precisely, they concentrate CPS adjusts the 
effectiveness of the board performance by inspiring collaboration and unity among board 
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members. So, the paper shows a negative relationship between CPS and firm performance 
measured by Tobin’s Q. A dynamic generalized method of moment (GMM-system) 
estimator is the used methodology in the paper. The empirical analysis data is in panel 
data form. The study findings are that high CPS cause in high likelihood negative effect 
on management team’s spirit and motivation. Besides, the study suggests that firms do 
better after the implementing of SoP in the U.K in 2002. A tournament incentive is 
supported when a subsample is considering the CEOs who age is above 60 years. 
However, the research result advocates that a high CPS can be used as a tournament 
incentive for firms in the U.K with the CEOs who can be changed in the short-term. 
Altogether, Tarkovska (2017) paper supports the importance of studying the executive 
compensation issue at the board level as well as supporting the recent ideologies of the 
U.K. corporate governance guidelines. The paper findings are similar to Bebchuk et al. 
(2011) and Correa and Lel (2014) papers. The results in the U.K and the U.S seems to be 
in line. Tarkovska (2017) discusses in her paper that the negative association between 
CPS and company performance might differ the U.K and U.S contexts. Particularly in the 
U.K is normal to propose the social comparison argument as a significant cause for the 
negative relationship between these.  
 
Australian researchers Yarram and Rice (2017) paper examines executive compensation 
between Australian mining and non-mining companies. Especially they focus is at risk-
taking, long and short-term incentives. The sample contains details of Australian 
Exchange (ASX) listed miners and non-miner’s companies from 2005 to 2013. They have 
information on 129 mining and 332 non-mining corporations. They find that larger firms 
have higher compensation. Correspondingly, profitability is positively associated with 
total executive compensation. In a negative association, they see the compensation as 
growth, performance and higher remarkable ownership. In general, Australian 
corporation pay-performance sensitives are low compared to the U.S. to the 
corresponding figures. The overall result supports the study for the optimal contracting 
concept and does not help the managerial power approach.  (Yarram & Rice 2017.) 
 
In case to compare the different results of the papers and attempt to explain the reason for 
those difference. First of all, all the papers have dissimilar data and variables what they 
use are not exactly identical. Additionally, the studies have different sample time period 
what they use and different locations, i.e., the U.K or the U.S. When one compare Al-
Najjar et al (2016) and Tarkovska (2017) studies and especially tables four and six, one 
can see that they have different methodology and variables used in their regression 
analysis. Moreover, the sample size and sample periods are different in those papers. To 
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be more precise, Al-Najjar et al. (2016) paper limits the firm-specific characteristics and 
corporate governance effects which may affect to get results what is aimed to get a 
positive association between the CPS and firm performance. 
 
 
3.3 CEO compensation and firm performance 
 
Brick et al. (2006) paper investigate CEO compensation, director compensation, and firm 
performance in the U.S. market between the years from 1992 to 2001. To be precise, the 
paper researches how excessive compensation for executives and CEOs is associated with 
company underachievement. The paper efforts to get a piece of evidence is there be found 
cronyism. Cronyism means an environment of weak governance where managers and 
executives place their interest ahead of the importance of investors. They use CEO cash 
compensation, CEO total compensation, director cash compensation, and director total 
compensation as the dependent variables. The independent variables are firm, CEO, and 
governance characteristics. A data sample consists of 1300 companies from Standard and 
Poor’s Execucomp and Compustat databases. They measure firm performance using 
Tobin’s Q and ROA parameters. The paper supports that executive compensation is 
highly linked to the monitoring and effort needs of executives to ensure value growth. 
(Brick et al. 2006.) 
 
Additionally, the paper discoveries a significant positive connection among CEO and 
director compensation, which can due to the omitted variables or overcompensation of 
executives and managers related to weak monitoring. Altogether, Brick et al. (2006) 
suggest the relationship among corporation performance and overcompensation to be 
negative. The positive association is found between CEO and director compensation 
relationship they suggest being due to cronyism. (Brick et al. 2006.) 
 
Sun, Wei, and Huang (2013) research paper examine CEO compensation and firm 
performance in the U.S. property and liability (P&L) insurance industry in 2000–2006. 
They use firm performance, the independent variables, as a proxy by efficiency estimated 
from data envelopment analysis. They use the dependent variable as the natural logarithm 
of compensation variables: cash compensation, incentive compensation, and total 
compensation. In the first step of the paper empirical research, they form data 
envelopment analysis model to evaluate efficiency outcomes, and in the second step, they 
use formed model to compare the level and construction of CEO compensation and 
efficiency for the sample. The paper finds a positive and significant association between 
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firm efficiency and CEO full compensation. Additionally, income efficiency is related 
more with the CEO cash compensation, and expense efficiency is a more frequent 
association with incentive compensation. Independent variables are not associated with 
ROA, which is used firm performance measurement in the academic papers. The reason 
for that could be the environment of P&L industry. The findings suggest that companies 
and policymakers focus build optimal compensation packages that inspire the CEOs to 
increase the shareholder’s wealth. The paper members used efficiency as a performance 
measurement because of the environment of the insurance industry where the insurance 
claims may take years to resolve, and claims are challenging to forecast. The 
methodology is more suitable than accounting and financial ratios in the insurance 
industry because it allows revealing the result of changes in the exogenous environment, 
which are above managers’ control.  
 
Ozkan Neslihan (2011) paper examines CEO compensation and firm performance in the 
U.K. non-financial firms in the time period 1999–2005. Data consist of 390 firms, 2304 
annual firm observations, which are in panel data form. CEO compensation includes 
salary, bonus, and equity-based constituents. Ozkan Neslihan (2011) uses the GMM-
system method which controls unnoticed firm-specific effects, indigeneity of independent 
variables, and corporate governance variables. Total compensation is defined as base 
salary, cash bonus, stock options, and long-term incentive plans. Empirical work uses the 
OLS regression model, where firm performance is measured by the stock return, and 
Tobin’s Q is measured by growth opportunities in the paper. The article outcome shows 
a positive and significant association among the level of CEO cash compensation and 
firm performance. To be precise, using natural logarithms of cash compensation and total 
compensation as the dependent variables. The writer found a positive, statistically 
significant association between cash compensation and stock return. In addition, a total 
compensation association with firm performance is a positive but not significant 
relationship. CEO cash compensation or total compensation related to growth 
opportunities have no significant association. Furthermore, CEO tenure is related to lower 
pay-for-performance compassion of option grants, which can point to the conclusion that 
the entrenchment effect of CEO affects to reduce pay-for-performance sensitivity. In 
addition, the proportion of non-executive directors on the board is not associated with 
CEO cash compensation. (Ozkan 2011.) 
 
A paper by Bhagat and Bolton (2014) examines an association among financial crisis and 
bank executive incentive compensation. They have a sample of the 14 largest U.S. 
financial institutions in time 2000–2008. The paper states that compensation which is 
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based on restricted stock and restricted stock options induce to decent results. (Bhagat & 
Bolton 2014.) 
 
Khan and Vieto (2013) examine the association among CEO gender and firm 
performance. Data consists of the U.S. market (S&P 1500) firms from 1992 to 2004. They 
use two sets of the independent variables, which are financial and governance variables. 
Governance variables are, for instance, CEO tenure and number of board meetings in a 
fiscal year. Both of those variables are used in natural logarithm forms in the statistical 
investigation. The paper found out companies with a male CEO seems to underperform 
compared to those firms who have a female CEO. Additionally, Khan and Vieto (2013) 
show that a female CEO lead firm incline to be more profitable measured by the return 
of an asset. Moreover, it appears that the company’s risk level is smaller when the CEO 
is female. However, the study explores risk-taking among genders, but there is not 
statistically significant evidence between gender’s adventurists. Altogether, Khan and 
Vieito (2013) did not found a link between CEO compensation and firm profitability 
where the natural logarithm of CEO total compensation was used as the dependent 
variable. (Khan & Vieto 2013.) 
 
A paper by Shah, Akbar, Liu, Liu and Cao (2017) examine CEO compensation and banks’ 
risk tolerance in period 2002–2008 and 2009–2013 in the U.S. They attention goes pre-
crisis and post-crisis financial crisis periods, and they examine how they discrepancy in 
those periods. The paper investigates the impact of CEO compensation because firms’ 
risk tolerance becomes a severe problem during the financial crisis in 2007–2008 that 
swallowed the global economy to a hard situation.  Especially the banking and finance 
sector were beleaguered because of CEO compensation and risk-taking. Banks were in a 
controlled situation, but at the same time, they could type their own choices, which impact 
the riskiness of the organizations. The choices determine the level and structure of CEO 
compensation, which impacts notably the risk-taking the behavior of CEOs that has as 
well impact to banks’ financial performance. The research uses a different kind of 
measures of risk as total risk, systematic risk, and idiosyncratic risk. In the pre-crisis 
period, the CEOs received bonuses decrease banks risk-taking in all three measures of 
risk. In the post-crisis period, the CEOs received restricted shares, and the options granted 
seemed to reduce banks’ risk tolerance. They find a positive effect of the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP) on banks’ risk. Additionally, the duration of time to maturity of 
options affect banks’ risk-taking conduct. Altogether, the research outcome appeared a 
significant effect on CEO compensation to firm performance because compensation 
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structure can reduce risk-taking affecting firm performance and motivating executives to 
increase principals’ wealth. (Shah, Akbar, Liu, Liu & Cao 2017.) 
 
A paper by Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorensen (2012) investigates the CEO individual 
characteristics’ influence on firm financial performance using the CEO’s operating on 
private equity funds between the years from 2000 to 2006. They find a positive 
association between CEO characteristics, like effectiveness, persistence, aggressiveness, 
proactiveness, the capability to organize and management abilities, and firm performance. 
Additionally, the CEO’s features are positively related to CEO accomplishment. 
However, the study finds a positive association between CEO’ characteristics execution, 
resoluteness, and overconfidence. 
 
Fiordelisi and Ricci (2004) paper examine corporate culture and CEO turnover 
association among the U.S. publicly listed companies. They attempt to discover the 
influence of culture on CEO turnover and firm financial achievement in the period from 
1992 to 2011. However, their study detects a robust negative association among firm 
performance and CEO turnover. In addition, dissimilar company cultures have a different 
influence on the likelihood of changing the managing directors. The likelihood is positive 
in competition and creation is supporting cultures, and likelihood is negative in highly 
controlled and antiseptic supporting cultures. (Fiordelisi & Ricci 2004.) 
 
Gabaix and Landier (2008) explore U.S. CEO compensation from the year 1980 to 2003. 
They built up a modest balance model which can predict the effect of CEO talent in a 
sizeable company. The model defines the level of CEO compensation over companies 
and across time.  They found a slight deviation in CEO talent, which, despite everything 
entitles enormous compensation discrepancy. Large businesses volume justifies most of 
CEO compensation outlines. The growth of CEO compensation, from the year 1980 to 
2003, can significantly support the growth in the market value of large companies. 
(Gabaix & Landier 2008.) 
 
 
3.4 Hypothesis 
 
The paper attempts to answer to question whether corporate governance has an influence 
on firm financial performance, in particular, whether firm performance is affected by 
higher executive compensation. The paper limit executive compensation to CEO 
compensation, which gives the impression of the firm’s top executive and his or her 
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influence on firm financial performance. Mehran (1995), Bebchuk et al. (2011), Brick et 
al. (2006) and Ozkan (2011), etc. papers have been supporting to form this paper 
hypothesis: the null hypothesis, the first alternative hypothesis, and the second alternative 
hypothesis. Mehran (1995), Sun et al. (2011) and Ozkan (2011) papers mostly lean to the 
first hypothesis and Bebchul et al. (2011), Brick et al. (2006) and Correa and Lel (2016) 
to the second alternative hypothesis. Taken together, the null hypothesis states that CEO 
compensation has no association to firm performance, and there is no relationship 
between those two factors. The null hypothesis does not have an agency problem, and 
companies have set the right level of compensation according to the importance of the 
top executive individual. The null hypothesis can be presented as follow, which is based 
on the papers which I mentioned above: 
 
H0 = There is no association between CEO compensation and firm financial 
performance. 
 
To address the alternative hypothesis, CEO compensation is positively associated with 
firm financial performance, and there is a positive relationship between those two factors. 
Based on previous literature, some papers have found a positive association with CEO 
compensation related to firm financial performance. For example, Mehran (1995), 
Bebchuk et al. (2011), Brick et al. (2006) and Ozkan (2011), etc. papers have guided to 
form a first alternative hypothesis. To address the second alternative hypothesis, CEO 
compensation is negatively associated with CEO compensation. For example, Bebchuk 
et al. (2011) Brick et al. (2006) and Tarkovska (2017), etc. found a negative relationship 
between the CEO pay slice and executive compensation. More specifically, CEO 
compensation is negatively associated with Tobin’s Q. In that paper, executive 
compensation is also negatively associated with profitability, which is measured by ROA. 
According to, for instance, Mehran (1995) paper, I can set up the first hypothesis as 
follow: 
 
H1 = CEO compensation is positively associated with firm financial performance. 
 
The alternative hypothesis is the opposite of the first hypothesis. According to literature 
reviews of the previous studies on the same subject, I can state that it can be high 
likelihood outcome to both alternative hypothesis results, for example., Bebchuk et al. 
(2011) Brick et al. (2006) and Tarkovska (2017). Here is the second alternative to the 
hypothesis as follow: 
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H2 = CEO compensation is negatively associated with firm financial performance. 
Related to, for example, Correa and Lel (2016) and Bebchuk et al. (2011) papers, they 
suggest that CEO compensation is negatively associated with firm financial performance. 
Thus, oversized executive compensation is unnecessary. Nevertheless, according to the 
opposite research article, I cannot be convinced of what is the accurate outcome between 
CEO compensation and firm performance. The expected result can additionally be 
diverse in a different time period. Because of this, I do the regressions analysis in different 
time periods, which is presented in the next chapter. Additionally, subsequent I examine 
individually time period 1993–2004 which hypothesis is based on Mehran (1995), Kato 
and Long (2006), etc. papers. Here is a third alternative to the following hypothesis: 
 
H3 = CEO compensation is positively associated with firm financial performance in time 
period 1993–2004. 
 
Furthermore, I examine time period 2005–2016 which hypothesis is based on, for 
instance, Bebchuk et al. (2011), and Brick et al. (2006) papers. The fourth alternative 
hypothesis is presented as follows: 
 
H4 = CEO compensation is negatively associated with firm financial performance in time 
period 2005–2016. 
 
After that investigation, where I examine separately time periods 1993–2004 and 2005–
2016, I examine is there a noticeable difference in empirical results of the pre-crisis period 
2004–2006 and financial crisis period 2007–2009. Shah et al. (2017) paper find that firms 
financial performance decrease in the financial crisis period which should decrease as 
well as executive compensation if compensation is performance-based. I strive for results 
is there a discrepancy between those two periods. Next, in this paper empirical research 
part, I examine the pre-crisis time period 2004–2006 which hypothesis is based, for 
instance., Erkens et al. (2012). Paper.  The subsequent hypothesis is presented as follows: 
 
H5 = CEO compensation is negatively associated with firm financial performance in the 
pre-crisis time period 2004–2006. 
 
In comparison, I investigate results in the crisis time period 2007–2009. If the association 
among CEO compensation and firm performance is negative in the pre-crisis time period, 
I will investigate whether the association will intensify during the crisis. Next alternative 
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hypothesis is based, for instance, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) paper. The sixth 
alternative hypothesis is presented as follows: 
 
H6 = CEO compensation is more negatively associated with firm financial performance 
in crisis time period 2007–2009. 
 
In empirical investigation section (the sixth paragraph) I test hypotheses in the S&P 500 
market. In that regression analysis, I examine is a null hypothesis accepted or rejected. In 
the event that the null hypothesis is rejected respectively, the alternative hypothesis will 
be accepted. In the first empirical regression section, I examine the whole time period and 
then separately time period 1993–2004 and 2005–2016. Hereafter, I examine the pre-
crisis time period 2004–2006 and the crisis time period 2007–2009. In the next paragraph, 
I introduce data and methodology what I use in the empirical regression analysis section. 
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4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter explains data and methodology what is used in this master’s thesis empirical 
part. Additionally, dependent variables, independent variables, and control variables are 
presented. Moreover, the formula what is used in the statistical analysis is formed in this 
chapter at the end. 
 
 
4.1 Data description 
 
This section describes data what is used in the research empirical study part. I use panel 
data analysis in the empirical part. Data is collected from a Compustat Execucomp 
database which contains information of executive compensation of publicly listed firms 
in the S&P 500 index, which is also known as S&P LargeCaps market index. In this 
paper, I use a dataset of the S&P LargeCap between the years from 1993 to 2016. So, the 
period is 16 years, which is targeting to find outcomes on CEO compensation to firm 
performance. The period was chosen for the reason that it lets me examine the more 
extended period effect on CEO compensation and firm performance. Moreover, I can 
investigate two different but as long periods 1993–2004 and 2005–2016. Additionally, I 
can investigate the pre-crisis and crisis periods. It allows me to see if there are differences 
in those periods. The sample in this study consists of 8650 observations, where are 11 
different variables used in statistical analysis. The executive compensation data is from 
Compustat Execucomp database, more precisely from Anncomp, Coperol, and Person 
database items. Financial data is from Codirfin and Colev database items. I use MS 
Access to collect data from a database and from Microsoft Excel to process data in an 
accessible form to Eviews program (Compustat Execucomp 2018). 
 
 
4.1.1 Dependent variables 
 
In this paper, I use three dependent variables to examine how independent variables affect 
those variables. I use Tobin’s Q, ROA and, ROE as dependent variables. Tobin’s Q 
measurers firms’ valuation, how to market equity value is to total asset value. It is used 
to see independent variables associated with the dependent variable.  ROA and ROE are 
likewise commonly used to measure profitability and used the opposite variable to the 
independent variable to see the associations. For example, in Bebchuk et al. (2011) paper 
is used Tobin’s Q and ROA as the dependent variable to see how executive compensation 
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correlates to firm performance. ROE is used as well to measure firm performance, i.e., 
Leonard (1990) paper use ROE to measure firm performance related to executive pay. 
Tobin’s Q is defined by market equity value divided by the total value of assets. ROA is 
defined by net income divided by book value of assets.  ROE is defined by net income 
divided by shareholder’s equity value. (Compustat Execucomp 2018.) 
 
 
4.1.2 Independent variable 
 
I use three independent variables in the statistical analysis, which are CEO salary, CEO 
bonus and, CEO other compensation. Variables are chosen because those variables are 
available evenly and well-matched to full-time period. CEO salary is an Execucomp 
product salary which is the dollar value of the base salary by the named CEO. The product 
is from an Anncomp table. CEO bonus is an Execucomp product bonus which is the dollar 
value of a bonus earned by the named CEO. The product is from an Anncomp table. CEO 
other compensation is an Execucomp product othcomp which is other compensation 
which is the dollar value of the other compensation by the named CEO. That can be fringe 
and personal benefits, contributions to bring into the assets of the company, notice or 
change-in-control payments, life policy benefits, gross-ups, and other tax repayments, 
cut-price share acquisitions, etc. All of three variables are originally in thousand units. I 
convert those variables to natural logarithm to the regression. In this paper is only shown 
the values in a converted form. (Compustat Execucomp 2018.) 
 
 
4.1.3 Control variables 
 
In statistical test data is five control variables. The variables are firm size, CEO tenure, 
executive director, CEO gender, and CEO age. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total 
assets of the firm, which is used control variable to measure company magnitude. Larger 
companies are more stable and less dependent on clientele or key employees, and 
therefore, the business is more valuable since its less risky.  The second variable, CEO 
tenure, is defined by table ANNCOMP current year subtract COPEROL product become 
CEO. CEO tenure means the CEO experience in the CEO position, and it is measured in 
years. Executive director variable is a dummy variable where one means that CEO 
belongs to the board of directors. Correspondingly zero means that the CEO is only in 
executive officer.  CEO gender dummy variable where value one means male gender and 
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zero female genders. CEO age variable in the current age of the executive officer. 
(Compustat Execucomp 2018.) 
 
 
4.2 Methodology 
 
The used methodology in this paper is a linear ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression 
model, which is run in a statistical program. The statistical program what is used in the 
thesis is Eviews. The empirical examination will be continued by studying the association 
between CEO compensation and financial performance in an ordinary least squares 
multivariate setup. To determine the linear association among the independent variables 
(CEO compensation) and dependent variables (firm financial performance), the 
subsequent regression model is formed: 
 
 
(1) Financial performancei,t = α + β1–3 (CEO compensation variables)i,t + β4–8 (control 
variables)i,t + εi,t 
 
 
where the dependent variable is firm financial performance measures, which are three 
alternatives, ROA, ROE or Tobin’s Q, for firm i at time t. The regression will be executed 
three times for all variable which signifies that CEO salary, CEO bonus, and CEO other 
compensation are investigated separately, for firm i at time t. In apiece of the optional 
regressions, the control variables, firm size, CEO tenure, executive director, CEO gender 
and CEO age are involved, for firm i at time t. α is an intercept of the regression line. β 
means the coefficients of the variables. ε presents an error term, for firm i at time t. 
Heteroscedasticity is verified by the White’s test.  
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
This chapter presents the empirical results of the regression analysis. Firstly, descriptive 
statistics are presented. Secondly, the correlation matrix is shown. Thirdly, regression 
results are exposed using independent variables separately. Thirdly, different periods of 
results are shown. Fourthly, regression results are shown in the pre-crisis period 2004–
2006 and the crisis period 2007–2009. 
 
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Data which is used in the regression analysis is shown in descriptive statistics that show 
data in summary. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the selected variables in the 
period 1993–2016. The table contains 11 variables and their mean, median, maximum, 
minimum, standard deviation values, and a number of observations. The first three 
variables are dependent, the three following variables are the independent variables, and 
the last five values are control variables. Totally 8532 observations were included in the 
statistical analysis. As you can see, independent variables (ROA, ROE and, Tobin’s Q) 
shows that the companies have comparatively decent financial performance numbers 
when ROA and ROE variables are positive. ROE’s mean and median values are near triple 
compared to ROA’s mean and median values. ROA with a mean of 0.06 and ROE with a 
mean of 0.15 are decent when means are positive, and companies do a roaring business. 
Moreover, Tobin’s Q mean value 1.32 implies that the observed firms are slightly 
overvalued; in other words, the total equity market value is a bit higher than the total asset 
value. CEO compensation variables: CEO salary, CEO bonus and, CEO other 
compensation, are the natural logarithm of those CEO compensation original values. 
Independent variables highest mean and median values have salary variable, other 
compensation has the second place, and bonus has the third place. Salary mean is 6.74 
and median 6.86, bonus mean is 3.30, and median is 3.42. Respectively, CEO other 
compensation values are 4.51, and 4.77. Firms’ size mean is 8.64, which is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. CEO tenure mean is 6.76 years.   So, CEO’s have seven years 
of experience in CEO position on average.  Executive director variable mean is 0.98, and 
likewise, CEO gender variable mean is on the same number. So, 2% of CEO’s in not 
additionally a member of the boards and 2% of CEO’s are females. They are the same in 
the descriptive statistics because of the rounding of the numbers.  Furthermore, 98% of 
CEO’s are males, and only 2% are females in the sample. CEO’s mean age is 56, and the 
median is 57 years. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
 
Variable  Mean  Median  Max.  Min.  Std. dev. No. of obs. 
ROA 0.06 0.05 0.48 -0.46  0.07 8532 
ROE 0.15 0.15 1.68 -1.70  0.19 8532 
Tobin’s Q 1.32 1.01 5.50 0.00  1.09 8532 
Salary 6.70 6.86 9.00 0.00  0.75 8532 
Bonus 3.30 3.42 11.25 0.00  3.48 8532 
Other compensation 4.51 4.78 11.48 0.00  1.76 8532 
Firm size 8.64 8.72 13.09 1.33  1.58 8532 
CEO tenure 6.76 5.00 53.00 0.00  6.78 8532 
Executive director 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.00  0.14 8532 
Gender 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.00  0.14 8532 
Age 56.51 57.00 86.00 28.00  6.52 8532 
 
 
5.2 Correlation 
 
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix of statistical data. The first number in the charts 
shows the statistical significance of correlation and star mark the statistical significance. 
Financial performance variables (dependent variables) relationship appears to be positive 
and pure between those three variables, which are ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q. ROA 
associates positively and significantly among ROE and Tobin’s Q. Correlation between 
the dependent variables and CEO compensation (independent) variables, salary, bonus 
and other compensation, seems to be highly correlated with two or more variables. ROA 
has a robust negative association with one of those independent variables, which is the 
salary variable. ROA has no significant correlation to bonus or other compensation 
variables. Respectively, ROE has a strong positive association to salary variable. Tobin’s 
Q has a strong and negative correlation among all three CEO compensation variables. 
ROA has a strong positive correlation with firm size control variable. A significant 
positive correlation is found between ROE and firm size and a strong negative relation 
between ROE and CEO tenure. Tobin’s Q has a noteworthy negative correlation with the 
CEO age control variable. Correspondingly, a positive association is found among CEO 
tenure, executive director control variables. Tobin’s Q has a significant negative 
correlation to firm size variable. The outcome of the correlation matrix is that the 
dependent variables have a negative association in total among the independent variables, 
which supports the second alternative hypothesis which states a negative relationship 
among CEO compensation and firm financial performance.  
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Table 2. Correlation matrix. 
 
Variable (1)   (2)    (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11) 
(1) ROA 1.000                     
(2) ROE 0.730 * 1.000                   
(3) Tobin’s Q 0.274 * 0.273 * 1.000                 
(4) Salary -0.041 * 0.033 * -0.136 * 1.000               
(5) Bonus -0.002  -0.005  -0.036 * -0.029  1.000             
(6) Other comp. -0.008  0.035 * -0.111 * 0.338 * -0.044 * 1.000           
(7) Firm size 0.107 * 0.172 * -0.203 * 0.181 * 0.106 * 0.259 * 1.000         
(8) CEO tenure 0.009  -0.035 * 0.063 * -0.037 * 0.016  0.039 * -0.067 * 1.000       
(9) Executive dir. 0.021  0.005  0.0034  -0.075 * 0.078 * -0.026  0.018  -0.005  1.000     
(10) Gender -0.009  -0.013  -0.011 * -0.027  0.073 * -0.045 * -0.035 * 0.065 * -0.008  1.000   
(11) Age -0.023  -0.001   -0.102  * 0.120 * 0.010   0.170 * 0.108 * 0.422 * -0.069 * 0.050 * 1.000 
* presents statistical significance at the 0.01 level. 
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5.3 Regression results 
 
Following paragraphs include the results of empirical regression analysis. Firstly, the 
results of CEO compensation and firm performance in 1993–2016. Secondly, the results 
of CEO compensation and firm performance in the separate periods between 1993–2004 
and 2005–2016. Thirdly, the results of CEO compensation and firm performance in the 
pre-crisis period 2004–2006 and the crisis period 2007–2009.  
 
 
5.3.1 CEO compensation and firm performance in 1993–2016 
 
Table 3 illustrates the results of regression analysis between dependent variables and CEO 
salary as an independent variable during the period 1993–2016. The estimated 
coefficients of variables are presented first with the appropriate t-value in the brackets 
below. The results show a negative statistically significant association among ROA and 
salary as well as Tobin’s Q and CEO salary at even 1% level where the coefficient for 
ROA is -0.005 with a t-statistic of -4.97 and the coefficient for Tobin’s Q is -0.130 with a 
t-statistic of -8.12. This indicates that CEO salary has a negative impact on the company’s 
performance when regression takes account the dependence of ROA and Tobin’s Q.  ROE, 
as the dependent variable, has no significant association to CEO salary. Additionally, 
ROA, as the dependent variable, has a significant positive association to firm size and 
CEO tenure at least at 1% level. Tobin’s Q has a significant negative association to firm 
size and a significant positive association to CEO tenure control variable. Additionally, 
ROE and firm size have a positive and significant association. ROA and Tobin’s Q have 
a negative involvement with CEO age control variable. The remaining control variables 
have a significant and positive association to executive director control variable at 5% 
level and a negative association to CEO gender control variable at 10% level to Tobin’s 
Q as the dependent variable. 
 
Table 3. CEO salary as the independent variable and financial performance 1993–2016. 
     
  ROA ROE Tobin’s Q 
     
Constant  0.063*** -0.008 4.09*** 
  (5.44) (-0.23) (21.79) 
Salary  -0.005*** 0.001 -0.130*** 
  (-4.97) (0.41) (-8.12) 
Firm size  0.005*** 0.021*** -0.116*** 
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  ROA ROE Tobin’s Q 
  (11.08) (15.39) (-15.42) 
CEO tenure  0.000*** -0.001 0.0156*** 
  (2.86) (-1.52) (8.29) 
Executive director  0.006 0.001 0.198** 
  (1.17) (0.08) (2.40) 
Gender  -0.003 -0.008 -0.138* 
  (-0.64) (-0.56) (-1.69) 
Age  -0.000*** -0.000 -0.019*** 
  (-3.43) (-0.91) (-9.44) 
     
Period fixed effect  YES YES YES 
No. of obs.  8532 8532 8532 
Adj. R²  1.5% 2.9% 6.3% 
F-stat.  5.54 9.70 20.76 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. T-statistics are informed in parentheses. 
     
     
Subsequent Table 4 consists of the same variable variables as the previous Table 3, but 
the independent variables are different. The independent variable is CEO bonus. The time 
period is 1993–2016 in Table 4. The constant is statistically significant with ROA and 
Tobin’s Q. CEO bonus appears to be connected negatively to ROA and ROE at even 1% 
level where the coefficient for ROA is -0.001 with a t-statistic of -2.97 and the coefficient 
for ROE is -0.003 with a t-statistic of -3.28. Additionally, it is negatively statistically 
significant to Tobin’s Q at 5% level where the coefficient is -0.010 with a t-statistic of -
2.27. Firm size, executive director, CEO gender and CEO age control variables appeared 
to be statistically significant in Table 4, where at least one of three were statistically 
significant at least 10% level. 
 
 
Table 4. CEO bonus as the independent variable and financial performance 1993–2016. 
     
  ROA ROE Tobin’s Q 
     
Constant  0.038*** 0.003 -3.394*** 
  (3.66) (0.12) (20.37) 
Bonus  -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.010** 
  (-2.97) (-3.28) (-2.27) 
Firm size  0.005*** 0.021*** -0.126*** 
  (10.52) (15.97) (-16.99) 
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  ROA ROE Tobin’s Q 
CEO tenure  0.000*** -0.001 0.017*** 
  (3.21) (-1.52) (8.81) 
Executive director  0.007 0.001 0.230*** 
  (1.39) (0.37) (2.77) 
Gender  -0.003 -0.007 -0.131* 
  (-0.55) (-0.48) (-1.60) 
Age  -0.001*** -0.000 -0.021*** 
  (-4.04) (-0.86) (-10.45) 
     
Period fixed effect  YES YES YES 
No. of obs.  8532 8532 8532 
Adj. R²  1.3% 3.0% 5.6% 
F-stat.  4.99 10.08 18.52 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. T-statistics are informed in parentheses. 
     
     
Subsequent Table 5 describes the same table as the previous table, but an independent 
variable is another substitute for the CEO, which is CEO other compensation. The 
constant is statistically significant among ROA and Tobin’s Q, but with ROE, the constant 
appeared not to be statistically significant. CEO other compensation variable shows 
negative and statistically significant association to ROA and Tobin’s Q at even 1% level. 
The coefficient for ROA is -0.001 with a t-statistic of -2.90, and the coefficient for Tobin’s 
Q is -0.033 with a t-statistic of -4.70. At least one of the three control variables of each 
type appeared to be statistically significant at least 10% level. 
 
 
Table 5. CEO Other compensation as the independent variable and financial performance 
1993–2016.      
  
ROA ROE Tobin’s Q      
Constant 
 
0.036*** -0.001 3.375***   
(3.52) (-0.047) (20.30) 
Other compensation 
 
-0.001*** -0.001 -0.033***   
(-2.90) (-0.65) (-4.70) 
Firm size 
 
0.005*** 0.021*** -0.117***   
(10.72) (15.33) (-15.28) 
CEO tenure 
 
0.000*** -0.001 0.017***   
(3.23) (-1.54) (8.86) 
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  ROA ROE Tobin’s Q 
Executive director 
 
0.007 0.001 0.232***   
(1.42) (0.06) (2.80) 
Gender 
 
-0.004 -0.009 -0.147*   
(-0.70) (-0.58) (-1.78) 
Age 
 
-0.001*** -0.000 -0.019***   
(-3.61) (-0.77) (-9.72)      
Period fixed effect 
 
YES YES YES 
No. of obs. 
 
8532 8532 8532 
Adj. R² 
 
1.3% 2.9% 5.8% 
F-stat. 
 
4.97 9.71 19.15 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. T-statistics are informed in parentheses. 
 
 
5.3.2 CEO compensation and firm performance in the separate periods 1993–2004 and 
2005–2016 
 
This paragraph shows CEO compensation and firm performance in the separate periods 
of 1993–2004 and 2005–2016. Moreover, the empirical result of panel regressions present 
is their difference for a previous and subsequent period results. As in the literature review 
section inform, there are divergent outcomes for different papers. The papers examine 
itemized those periods, which may affect the results. The paper uses different sample 
periods; hence earlier studies show more often a positive association (Mehran 1995) and 
more recent studies a negative association (Bebchuk et al. 2011). 
 
Following chapter represents CEO compensation as an independent variable, financial 
performance as a dependent variable and control variables results in two distinct periods’ 
1993–2004 and 2005–2016. Control variables are the same as in the previous chapter. 
The regression results are used to find out whether there are any results in these periods. 
In table 6 is presenting CEO compensation and financial performance in 1993–2004. The 
estimated coefficients for CEO salary are negatively and statistically significantly 
associated with ROA and Tobin’s Q at 5% and 1% level. The coefficient for ROA is -
0.004 with a t-statistic of -2.42, and the coefficient for Tobin’s Q is -0.101 with a t-statistic 
of -3.61.  The estimated coefficient for CEO bonus is otherwise positively and statistically 
significant for ROA at 10% and Tobin’s Q at 1% level. The coefficient for ROA is 0.001 
with a t-statistic of 1.68 and the coefficient for Tobin’s Q is 0021 with a t-statistic of 2.60. 
The estimated coefficients for CEO other compensation did not show any significant 
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relationship with the dependent variables. Control variable firm size presents a significant 
association to ROA and ROE at even 1% level. Correspondingly, firm size variable shows 
a negative association with Tobin’s Q at 1% level. Control variable CEO gender is 
negatively statistically significant at 1% level with ROE and negatively statistically 
significant at 1% level with Tobin’s Q in Table 6. Additionally, it has a negative and 
statistically significant association only with ROE at 5% level. Control variable CEO age 
is related to dependent variable ROE at 10% level in Table 6.  The remaining control 
variables did not show a significant association in Table 6.  
 
 
Table 6. CEO compensation and financial performance in 1993–2004. 
     
  ROA ROE Tobin’s Q 
     
Constant  0.048 -0.175* 4.475*** 
  (1.37) (-1.82) (8.20) 
Salary  -0.004** 0.003 -0.101*** 
  (-2.42) (0.557) (-3.61) 
Bonus  0.001* 0.001 0.021*** 
  (1.68) (1.03) (2.60) 
Other compensation 0.001 -0.000 -0.003 
  (1.23) (-0.02) (-0.36) 
Firm size  0.005*** 0.021*** -0.115*** 
  (5.97) (9.13) (-8.91) 
CEO tenure  0.000** -0.001 0.015*** 
  (2.10) (-1.62) (5.48) 
Executive director  -0.022 0.020 -0.085 
  (-0.73) (0.25) (-0.18) 
Gender  0.020 0.157*** -1.075*** 
  (1.52) (4.43) (-5.34) 
Age  -0.000 -0.001* -0.010 
  (-1.37) (-1.70) (-3.29) 
     
Period fixed effect  YES YES YES 
No. of obs.  3408 3408 3408 
Adj. R²  1.2% 3.6% 5.4% 
F-stat.  3.19 7.63 11.24 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. T-statistics are informed in parentheses. 
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The same regression method, as in Table 6, is presented in Table 7 below, but the period 
is 2005–2016. The estimated coefficients for CEO salary are negatively and significantly 
associated with ROA, and Tobin’s Q at even 1% level. The coefficient for ROA is -0.005 
with a t-statistic of -3.57 and the coefficient for Tobin’s Q is -0132 with a t-statistic of -
6.28. Likewise, the estimated coefficients for CEO bonus are negatively and significantly 
connected with ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q at even 1% level in all those dependent 
variables. The coefficient for ROA is -0.001 with a t-statistic of -4.33, the coefficient for 
ROE is -0.005 with a t-statistic of 4.87, and the coefficient for Tobin’s Q is -0.019 with a 
t-statistic of -3.42. Moreover, the estimated coefficients for CEO other compensation are 
also negatively statistically significant for ROA at even 1% level and Tobin’s Q at 10% 
level. The coefficient for ROA is -0.002 with a t-statistic of -3.67, and the coefficient for 
Tobin’s Q is -0.037 with a t-statistic of -3.77. Control variable firm size appears to be 
associated positively and statistically significantly related to the results of both ROA and 
ROE dependent variables. Moreover, there is also a strong negative association between 
Tobin’s Q and firm size.  Additionally, CEO tenure control variable is positively and 
significantly connected with ROA at 5% level and for Tobin’s Q at even 1% level in Table 
6 and Table 7. However, control variable executive director shows a positive and 
significant association with only Tobin’s Q in Table 7 but not a sign of strong association 
in Table 6. Control variable CEO age has a negative and statistically significant 
connection to solely dependent variable ROA in Table 7.   
 
 
Table 7. CEO compensation and financial performance in 2005–2016. 
     
  ROA ROE Tobin’s Q 
     
Constant  0.081*** 0.016 4.387*** 
  (5.78) (0.39) (18.77) 
Salary  -0.005*** 0.001 -0.132*** 
  (-3.57) (0.38) (-6.28) 
Bonus  -0.001*** -0.005*** -0.019*** 
  (-4.33) (-4.87) (-3.42) 
Other compensation -0.002*** -0.002 -0.037* 
  (-3.67) (-0.90) (-0.11) 
Firm size  0.005*** 0.021*** -0.110*** 
  (9.26) (11.79) (-11.39) 
CEO tenure  0.001** -0.000 0.017*** 
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  ROA ROE Tobin’s Q 
  (2.39) (0.09) (6.41) 
Executive director  0.006 0.000 0.187** 
  (1.20) (0.03) (2.21) 
Gender  -0.008 -0.040** 0.026 
  (-1.49) (-2.41) (0.29) 
Age  -0.001*** -0.000 -0.024 
  (-3.30) (-0.06) (-8.82) 
     
Period fixed effect  YES YES YES 
No. of obs.  5124 5124 5124 
Adj. R²  2.4% 3.3% 8.1% 
F-stat.  7.74 10.06 24.76 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. T-statistics are informed in parentheses. 
 
 
5.3.3 CEO compensation and firm performance in the pre-crisis period 2004–2006 and 
the crisis period 2007–2009 
 
The financial crisis, which was around years 2007, 2008 and 2009, might have influenced 
to CEO compensation and firm performance association, which this paragraph 
investigates. Moreover, this paragraph strives for comparison difference among the pre-
crisis period 2004–2006 and in the course of the financial crisis.  Firstly, the results under 
the pre-crisis period are shown. Secondly, the results during financial results are 
presented. Following tables use the same independent, dependent, and control variables 
as the previous empirical regressions.  
 
Table 8 represents the results of the pre-crisis period 2004–2006. First of all, the 
independent variables did not show a strong association in Table 8. In that Table 8, only 
CEO other compensation variable is negatively highly significant at 1% level to Tobin’s 
Q variable where the coefficient for Tobin’s Q is -0.090 with a t-statistic of -4.77. To 
addition, following control variables: firm size, CEO tenure, CEO gender, and CEO age, 
appeared to be statistically significant for Tobin’s Q in Table 8. CEO tenure appeared to 
be positively associated with Tobin’s Q and the remaining ones negatively associated. 
Moreover, firm size control variable is indicated to be negatively and statistically 
significantly associated with ROA and Tobin’s Q at even 1% level in Table 9. CEO tenure 
control variable appeared to be positively associated with Tobin’s Q at 1% level.  
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Moreover, control variable CEO gender is negatively associated with ROE at 1% level. 
Furthermore, control variable CEO gender is negatively related to Tobin’s Q at 1% level.  
 
 
Table 8. CEO compensation and financial performance in the pre-crisis period 2004–2006. 
     
  ROA ROE Tobin’s Q 
     
Constant  0.160 -0.261 7.171*** 
  (1.62) (-0.96) (4.66) 
Salary  -0.001 0.014 -0.079 
  (-0.29) (1.57) (-1.57) 
Bonus  0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.46) (0.61) (0.06) 
Other compensation 0.001 0.001 -0.090*** 
  (0.35) (0.97) (-4.78) 
Firm size  -0.007 0.033* -0.404*** 
  (-0.95) (1.73) (-3.77) 
CEO tenure  -0.000 -0.001 0.019*** 
  (-0.14) (-1.06) (3.39) 
Executive director  -0.008 0.040 0.154 
  (-0.13) (0.22) (0.15) 
Gender  -0.009 0.031 -0.691** 
  (-0.43) (0.51) (-2.04) 
Age  -0.001 -0.001 -0.019*** 
  (-1.54) (-0.89) (-3.74) 
  
   
Period fixed effect  YES YES YES 
No. of obs.  1062 1062 1062 
Adj. R²  0.4% 0.2% 5.7% 
F-stat.  0.59 1.18 7.37 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. T-statistics are informed in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 9 provides the result of CEO compensation and firm performance during the 
financial crisis in the years 2007–2009. Nevertheless, during the crisis, Table 9, show a 
notably stronger negative association to performance compared to pre-crisis results in 
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Table 8. The independent variables show a strong negative association to dependent 
variables where at least one of association among the independent variable and the 
dependent variable is at 1% level. CEO salary has s strong negative association to Tobin’s 
Q variable at 1% level where the coefficient for Tobin’s Q is -0.148 with at t-statistic of 
-3.29. Moreover, CEO bonus has a negative association to ROA and ROE at even 1% 
level and Tobin’s Q at 10% level. The coefficient for ROA is -0.002 with a t-statistic of -
3.73, the coefficient for ROE is -0.009 with a t-statistics of 4,67, and the coefficient for 
Tobin’s Q is -0.020 with a t-statistic of -1.89.  Additionally, CEO other compensation has 
a strong negative relationship to ROA and Tobin’s Q at 1% level where the coefficient for 
ROA is -0.003 with a t-statistic of -3.05 and for Tobin’s Q is -0.089 with a t-statistics of -
4.43. According to Table 8 and Table 9, there is found a negative association among the 
independent and dependent variables at the crisis period but not hence strong association 
at the pre-crisis period. Altogether, these results indicate that association among CEO 
compensation and firm performance is negative and statistically significant at crisis 
period in 2007–2009. The pre-crisis period had a minor association between CEO 
compensation and firm performance, nonetheless only with one variable. 
 
 
Table 9. CEO compensation and financial performance in the crisis period 2007–2009. 
     
  ROA ROE Tobin’s Q 
     
Constant  0.357*** 0.393** 8.350*** 
  (5.83) (2.01) (7.79) 
Salary  -0.004 -0.002 -0.148*** 
  (-1.56) (-0.26) (-3.29) 
Bonus  -0.002*** -0.009*** -0.020* 
  (-3.73) (-4.67) (-1.89) 
Other compensation 0.001*** -0.004 -0.089*** 
  (-3.05) (-0.01) (-4.43) 
Firm size  -0.025*** -0.010 -0.513*** 
  (-4.34) (-0.52) (-5.02) 
CEO tenure  0.000 0.001 0.019 
  (1.45) (0.79) (3.51) 
Executive director  0.013 0.018 0.254 
  (1.45) (0.66) (1.60) 
Gender  -0.016 -0.114*** 0.160 
  (-1.29) (-2.99) (0.73) 
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  ROA ROE Tobin’s Q 
Age  -0.001 -0.001 -0.027*** 
  (-1.64) (-0.77) (-5.14) 
  
   
Period fixed effect  YES YES YES 
No. of obs.  1273 1273 1273 
Adj. R²  3.7% 1.9% 7.8% 
F-stat.  5.94 3.41 11.71 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. T-statistics are informed in parentheses. 
 
 
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) investigated bank CEO compensation and the financial 
crisis. The paper sample is from the year 2006 to 2008. They found that banks modest 
financial performance was because of unpredicted risk. Moreover, compensation which 
was affiliated with the interest of shareholders performed inferior. Banks, where CEOs 
had lesser compensations, performed better than banks with higher compensations. 
Especially, cash bonus and stock options had a disadvantageous effect on performance at 
crisis time. Fahlenbrach and Stulz justify that CEOs with more top compensations run a 
chance that other CEOs did not.  
 
Additionally, CEOs lost plenty of wealth because of holdings of shares and to options. 
My paper results and Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) paper results refer to the conclusion 
that CEO compensation might weaken firm performance during the crisis. In other words, 
CEO compensation does not improve firm financial crisis at crisis time.  Table 8 and 
Table 9 results support the fifth and sixth alternative hypotheses. 
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6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Based on academic research, we can detect that there is a relation between CEO 
compensation and firm performance. The purpose of this document was to provide 
information on CEO compensation and how it combines the company’s financial 
performance with U.S companies between the years 1993 and 2016.  A market index is 
the S&P 500 index, where the empirical analysis is examining how the CEO’s 
compensation and financial results concerning different periods. Moreover, the study 
examined how the association changes with time. Notably, the paper strived to find is 
there found a disparity in two different 12-years period, and the pre-crisis and the crisis 
period. According to the executive compensation principles (Larcker & Tayan 2015, etc.), 
CEO compensation should be at parallel which justifies CEOs to executive firms to 
enhanced accomplishments. 
 
Mehran (1995) examined an association with executive compensation and company 
performance. He found a positive relationship, which was the result of a somewhat aged 
sample. A paper by Bebchuk et al. (2011) found the opposite results where CEO 
compensation is negatively associated with firm performance. Bebchuk et al. (2011) 
sample are developed from more recent data than Mehran (1995) study. In addition, a 
study by Khan and Vieito (2013) did not found a relationship among CEO compensation 
and firm financial performance. Based on those previous studies, it is essential to absorb 
CEO compensation relevance to firm financial performance. Overall, it appears that the 
effect of time might affect CEO compensation and firm performance relationship.  
 
This study was conducted by first investigate CEO compensation and firm performance 
for the entire period 1993–2016. Secondly, the association period is divided into two 
periods 1993–2004 and 2005–2016. Thirdly, the empirical analysis examines the pre-
crisis period 2004–2006 and the crisis period 2007–2009. Firstly, when I investigate the 
whole period result. I find an overall negative association between CEO compensation 
and firm performance using CEO salary, bonus, and other compensation variables as the 
dependent variable and ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q as the independent variables.  In the 
results, I was using firm size, CEO tenure, executive director, CEO gender, and CEO age 
control variables. Secondly, I separated the period to two different periods, which were 
1993–2004 and 2005–2016. The first earlier period did contribute a pure response for the 
association when the coefficients for the CEO salary were negative with ROA and 
Tobin’s Q, and the estimated coefficients for CEO bonus were alternatively positive. CEO 
other compensation did not show a sign. The results of the second season 2005-2016 
  
55 
show a negative association. Thirdly, the paper found that a negative association becomes 
more evident during the crisis period compared results in the pre-crisis period. The pre-
crisis period did not show a strong association. 
 
The overall results present a negative association. The beginning of period results shows 
slightly weaker relation results, but the association strengthens in recent years. An 
explanation for change might change in regulation, and economic situation, firm returns 
level or CEO responsibilities (e.g., Bainbridge 2012). The paper suggests further research 
to investigate an association in different industries, for example, comparing information 
technology and electrical engineering industries. Additionally, the banking industry could 
be removed in the sample. In this thesis, all industries were included in the sample. 
 
Moreover, for further research to examine different locations and compare their results, 
it is a wide range of CEO compensation around the world and the largest compensations 
come from the developed countries which have a status as a great power state Differences 
in the features of environments cause the dissimilarity among company construction of 
all business organization in diverse economies. (e.g., Brealey et al. 2017.)  
  
56 
REFERENCES 
 
Ammann M., Oesch D. & Schmid M. (2011). Corporate governance and firm value: 
 International evidence. Journal of Empirical Finance 18, 36–55. 
 
Al-Najjar B., Ding R. & Hussainey K. (2016). Determinants and value relevance of UK 
 CEO pay slice. International Review of Applied Economics 30:3, 403-421. 
 
Bainbridge, S. M. (2012). Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis. New York: 
 Oxford University Press, Inc. 283 p. ISBN 978–0–19–977242–1. 
 
Bauer R., Guenster N. & Otter R. (2004). Empirical evidence on corporate governance in 
 Europe: The effect on stock returns, firm value and performance.  Journal of 
 Asset Management 5:2, 91–104. 
 
Bebchuk, L., Cremers M., & Peyer U. (2011). The CEO pay slice. Journal of Financial 
 Economics 102, 199–221. 
 
Bebchuk L. Cohen A. & Ferrell A. (2009). What Matters in Corporate Governance? 
 Review of Financial Studies 22:2, 783–827. 
 
Becker, B (2006). Wealth and executive compensation. Journal of Finance 61:1, 379–
 397. 
 
Bhagat S. & Bolton B. (2008). Corporate governance and firm performance. 
 Journal of Corporate Finance 14:3, 257–273. 
 
Bhagat S. & Bolton B. (2014). Financial crisis and bank executive incentive 
 compensation. Journal of Corporate Finance 25, 313–341. 
 
Bolton, P. Mehran, H & Shapiro, J (2015). Executive Compensation and Risk Taking. 
 Review of Finance 19:6, 2139–2181. 
 
Brealey R., Myers S. & Allen F. (2017). Principles of Corporate  Finance. 12th 
 edition. New York. McGraw-Hill Inc. 976 p. ISBN: 978–1–259–25333–1. 
 
  
57 
Brick I., Palmon O. & Wald J. (2006). CEO compensation, director compensation, and 
 firm performance: Evidence of cronyism? Journal of Corporate Finance 12:3, 
 403–423. 
 
Buigut K., Soi N. & Koskei I. (2014). Determinants of CEO Compensation Evidence
 from UK Public Limited Companies. International Journal of Business and 
 Management 10:1, 223–230. 
 
Coles J.L., Naveen D. D. & Naveen L. (2006). Managerial incentives and risk-taking. 
 Journal of Financial Economics 79:2, 431–468. 
 
Compustat Execucomp (2018). Execucomp datastream [cited 12.09.2018]. Microsoft 
 Excel. 
 
Correa R. & Lel U. (2016). Say on pay laws, executive compensation, pay slice, and firm
 valuation around the world. Journal of Financial Economics 112:3, 500–520. 
 
Erkens, D., Mingyi H. & Pedro M. (2012). Corporate Governance in the 2007–2008
  Financial Crisis: Evidence from Financial Institutions Worldwide. Journal of 
 Corporate Finance 18:2, 389–411. 
 
Fahlenbrach R. & Stulz R. M. (2011). Bank CEO incentives and the credit crisis. Journal 
 of Financial Economics 99:1, 11–26. 
 
Fama E. F. (1980). Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Political
  Economy 88:2, 288–307. 
 
Fiordelisi F. & Ricci O. (2014). Corporate culture and CEO turnover. Journal of 
 Corporate Finance 28, 66–82. 
 
Gabaix X. & Lanrier A. (2008). Why has CEO pay increased so much? The Quarterly 
 Journal of Economics 123:1, 49–100. 
 
Gompers, P. A., Ishii J. L., & Metrick A. (2003). Corporate governance and equity prices. 
 Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, 107–155. 
 
  
58 
Huson M., Malatesta P. & Parrino R. (2004). Managerial succession and firm 
 performance. Journal on Financial Economics 74, 237–275. 
 
Huson M., Parrino, R. & Sarks, L. (2001). Internal Monitoring Mechanisms 
and CEO Turnover: A Long-Term Perspective. The Journal of Finance 56:6, 
 2265–2297. 
 
Jensen M and Meckling W. (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
 Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3:4, 305–360. 
 
Jensen M. & Murphy K. (1990). Performance Pay and Top–Management Incentives. 
 Journal of Political Economy 98:2, 225–264. 
 
Kaplan, S., M. Klebanov & M. Sorensen (2012). Which CEO characteristics and abilities 
 matter?     The Journal of Finance 67, 973–1007. 
 
Kato T. & Long C. (2006). Executive compensation, firm performance, and corporate 
 governance in China: evidence from firms listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen
 stock exchanges. Economic Development and Cultural Change 54:4, 945–983. 
 
Khan, W. A. & J. P. Vieito (2013). CEO gender and firm performance. Journal of 
 Economics and Business 67, 55–66. 
 
Larcker, D. & Tayan, B. (2016). Corporate Governance Matters: A Closer Look at 
 Organizational Choices and Their Consequences. 2th edition. Pearson Education, 
 Inc. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey. 464 p. ISBN 978–0–13–403156–9. 
 
Leonard J. (1990). Executive Pay and Firm Performance. Industrial and Labor Relations
  Review 43:3, 13–29. 
 
Lomax, S. (2001). Best practices for managers and expatriates: A guide on selection,
 hiring, and compensation. New York: Wiley. 320 p. ISBN 0–471–39206–5. 
 
Mehran H. (1995). Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance. 
 Journal of Financial Economics, 38:2, 163–184.  
 
  
59 
Monks, R. A. G. & Minow N. (2011). Corporate Governance. 5th ed. John Wiley & 
 Sons, Ltd. 512 p. ISBN 978–0–470–97259–5. 
 
Morse, A., Nanda, V. & Seru, A. (2011). Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful
  CEOs? Journal of Finance 66:5, 1779–1821. 
 
Murphy, K. (1999). Chapter 38 Executive compensation. Handbook of Labour 
 Economics 3: part B, 2485–2563. 
 
Murphy K. (2003). Stock-based pay in new economy firms. Journal of Accounting and 
 Economics 34:1–3, 129–47. 
 
Ozkan N. (2011). CEO Compensation and Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation 
 of UK Panel Data. European Financial Management 17:2, 260–285. 
 
Raviv, A. & Sisli-Ciamarra, E. (2013). Executive compensation, risk taking and the state 
 of the economy. Journal of Financial Stability 9:1, 55–68. 
 
Salas, J. (2010). Entrenchment, governance, and the stock price reaction to sudden
 executive deaths. Journal of Banking and Finance 34, 656–666.

Schneider, P. (2011). Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Legislation Addresses Executive 
 Compensation. Journal of Financial Service Professionals 65:1, 27–31. 
 
Shah S., Akbar S., Liu J., Liu Z. & Cao S. (2017). CEO compensation and banks’ risk-
 taking during pre and post financial crisis periods. Research in International 
 Business and Finance 42, 1489–1503. 

Solomon J. (2004). Corporate Governance and Accountability. 2nd ed. Chichester: John 
 Wiley & Sons Ltd. 318 p. ISBN 0–470–84365–9. 
 
Sun F., Wei X. & Huang X. (2013). CEO compensation and firm performance: Evidence
 from the US property and liability insurance industry. Review of Accounting and 
 Finance 12:3, 252–267. 
 
Tarkovska V.V. (2017). CEO pay slice and firm value: evidence from UK panel data. 
 Review of Behavioral Finance 9:1, 43–62. 
  
60 
 
Tosi H. & Gomez-Mejia (1994). CEO Compensation Monitoring and Firm 
  Performance. Academy of Management Journal 37:4, 1002–1016. 
 
Yarram S. R. & Rice J. (2017). Executive compensation among Australian mining and
 non-mining firms: Risk taking, long and short-term incentives. Economic 
 Modelling 64, 211–220. 
 
